Abstract-In this paper, we study a model of communication under adversarial noise. In this model, the adversary makes online decisions on whether to corrupt a transmitted bit based on only the value of that bit. Like the usual binary symmetric channel of information theory or the fully adversarial channel of combinatorial coding theory, the adversary can, with high probability, introduce at most a given fraction of error.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the usual definitions of discrete channels in information theory. It is assumed that transmissions of symbols from a discrete alphabet take place and a fraction of the transmissions may result in erroneous reception. The sender is allowed to "encode" information in to an array of symbols, called a codeword. The collection of all possible codewords is called a "code" (or "codebook"). Without much loss of generality, we can assume that all transmitted codewords are equally likely, in which case the log-size of a code signify the amount of information that can be transmitted with the code. In a completely adversarial channel, the adversary is allowed to see the transmitted set of symbols (codeword) completely and then decides which of the transmitted symbols are to be corrupted (it is allowed to corrupt a given fraction of all symbols).
Recently, in a series of papers [8] , [10] , [13] , the study of online or causal adversarial channels is initiated, in particular, for binary-input channels. Let us start by giving an informal definition of a causal adversarial channel. In the causal adversarial model, an adversary is allowed to see the transmitted codeword only causally (i.e., at any instance it sees only the past transmitted symbols), and decides whether to corrupt the current transmitted symbol. An upper bound on the capacity (maximum rate of reliable information transfer) of such channel is presented in [8] . One of the most interesting observation is that, such channels are limited by the "Plotkin bound," of coding theory: whenever the fraction of error introduced by the adversary surpasses 1 4 , the capacity is zero (assuming binary This work was supported in part by NSF grant CCF 1318093 and a grant from University of Minnesota. input). On the other hand, by "random coding" method, a lower bound is established in [10] . This lower bound beats the famous Gilbert-Varshamov bound, the best available lower bound for a completely adversarial channel.
We below describe an adversarial channel model that is weaker (in terms of adversary limitations) than the above causal channel. In particular, the adversary is not even allowed to see the past transmitted symbols, but decides whether to corrupt a symbol based on only the current transmission. Our initial aim is to see whether the channel capacity is still dictated by the Plotkin bound.
A. A memoryless (truly online) adversary
In this work we consider the code to be deterministic, in a sense that is described below. Also, we assume that the input alphabet to be binary ({0, 1}). A code C is simply a subset of F n 2 . The size of the code denotes the number of messages encodable with this code; and therefore the amount of information encodable is log |C|. In here and subsequently, all logarithms are base-2, unless otherwise mentioned. The rate of the code is log |C| n . Given the code, the adversarial channel consists of n (possibly random) functions f i C : F 2 → F 2 , i = 1, . . . , n. Suppose a randomly and uniformly chosen codeword x " (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) P C is transmitted. At the ith time instant, the adversary will produce e i = f i C (x i ), taking only the current transmitted symbol x i as argument (and of course, taking into account the code C, which is known to the adversary). Here, e i is the indicator of an error at the ith position, i = 1, . . . , n. That is, the channel produces y i = x i + e i , at the ith time-instance, where the addition is of course over F 2 .
Definition 1: The adversary is called weakly-p-limited, 0 ď p ď 1, if the expected (with respect to the randomness in f i C s and x) Hamming weight of the error-vector e = (e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n ) = (f
A more restrictive adversary (strongly-p-limited) must have,
A code is associated with a (possibly randomized) decoder φ : F n 2 → C. For a given pair of transmitted codeword and error vector, x P C, e P F φ(x + e) ‰ x. Given C and p, define Adv w (C, p) to be the collection of all weakly-p-limited adversary strategies. That is,
. . , n} P Adv w (C, p) if and only if, E wt(f C (x)) ď pn. Similarly, we can name the collection of all strongly-p-limited adversary strategies as Adv s (C, p).
Our results, as in the case of causal adversarial channels of [13] , holds for the case of average probability of error 1 . The average probability of error is defined to be, P
The maximum possible size of "good" codes are:
and,
Now, define the capacities to be,
It is evident that,
where h B (x) = −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x) is the binary entropy function. This is true because, a strongly-p-limited adversary strategy is to flip each symbol with probability p, independently. That is, oblivious to the input, the adversary can always simulate a binary symmetric channel, whose capacity is 1 − h B (p).
B. Context of the model and our contributions
It is counterintuitive to assume that the adversary, being memoryless, cannot store the previously transmitted bits, or its own actions, however, has access to the entire code and can do computations on them. But it should be noted that, the entire computation of the adversary is done offline, and in each transmission, it just performs according to one of the two options. Also note that, the adversary knows the timeinstance of the transmission, i.e., the fact that ith transmission, among the n possible, is taking place. Hence the adversary is allowed to store only one pointer and otherwise memoryless. The main purpose of introducing this model is to see how weak the adversary can be and still have its capacity dictated by the Plotkin bound.
On the other hand, the concept of such memoryless adversary appears in principle before in literature. General classes of restricted adversarial channels were considered as arbitrarily varying channels (AVCs) [2] , [5] , [6] or oblivious channels [12] . The distinction between the weakly-limited and stronglylimited adversary is not new in the literature of AVCs. For example, in [11] , it was shown that in a Gaussian AVC, when the adversary has only average power constraint, reliable communication is impossible for any positive rate. Whereas, when the adversary power is bounded almost surely, the capacity can be positive.
Our channel model is a variant of AVCs, and hence further discussion on AVCs is warranted at this point. But we omit such discussion due to space constraints. A pertinent remark is that the capacity of strongly-limited adversary above does not follow from the standard results on AVC capacities.
From [9, Thm. C.1] (see also, [1] ), it is evident that the capacity of weakly-p-limited adversary is 0 for p ą 4 . It is also proved there that, if the adversary can keep a count of how many bits it has flipped (a log-space channel), then the same fact holds for strongly limited adversaries as well.
In Sec. II, we present the above fact regarding weaklylimited adversary in a way that is amenable to our definitions. We then attempt to extend this result to the case of stronglylimited adversary, which forms the main contribution of this paper. In Sec. III we review the important notions of distance distribution of a code that proves useful in this context. In Sec. IV, we show that the capacity of a strongly-p-limited adversary is strictly separated from the capacity of a BSC(p). In particular we give an upper bound on C s (p) that is strictly below 1 − h B (p) for all p ą 
II. WEAKLY-LIMITED ADVERSARY
In this small section, we establish the following fact. Theorem 1: C w (p) = 0 for p ě To prove the theorem, the below lemma, known as the Plotkin bound, is used crucially.
Lemma 2 (Plotkin Bound): Suppose, C Ď F n 2 is the code and |C| = M. Randomly and uniformly (with replacement) choose two codeword x 1 , x 2 from C. Then,
where d H (¨) is the Hamming distance. Proof: Consider an Mˆn matrix with the codewords of C as its rows. Suppose, λ i is the number of 1s in the ith column of the matrix, i = 1, . . . , n. Then,
Hence, Ed H (x 1 , x 2 ) ď n 2 , where, x 1 , x 2 are two randomly and uniformly chosen codewords.
Proof of Theorem 1 [9] : We show that there exists an adversary strategy that achieves the claim of the lemma. Suppose, C Ă F n 2 is the code and |C| = M. The adversary (channel) first choses a codeword x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) P F 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) is the transmitted codeword, then,
where, e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ). Hence, the adversary is weakly-
On the other hand, Pr(x = c) =
Hence, even the maximum likelihood decoder will have a probability of error ě 1{2 − 1 M . Therefore, C w (p) = 0 for p ě 1{4.
III. DISTANCE DISTRIBUTION
To extend Thm. 1 to the case of strongly-limited adversary, we need to show an adversary strategy, that, with high probability, keep the number of errors within pn. However, for the adversary strategy of Thm. 1 to do this, we need the result of Lemma 2 to be stronger, i.e., a high probability statement. Let us now introduce some notations that help us cast Lemma 2 as a high-probability result.
The distance distribution of a code is defined in the following way. Suppose, C Ď F n 2 be a code. Let, for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n,
As can be seen, A 0 = 1. The dual distance distribution of a code is defined to be, for i = 0, 1, . . . , n,
where 
Proof: For a proof of the lemma, see [15, p. 132 ].
Lemma 4: Suppose, C Ď F n 2 is the code with dual distance greater than 2, and |C| = M. Randomly and uniformly (with replacement) choose two codeword x 1 , x 2 from C. Then,
Proof: From Lemma 3, for any r ă d K ,
r n i n r r .
In particular, substituting r = 2 we have,
The implication of the above result is following. For any code C with dual distance greater than 2, there exists a strongly-p-limited adversary strategy such that, probability of error is at least . On the other hand, if the dual distance is that small, then the code must have a skewed or asymmetric distance distribution. In the next section, we will (formally) see that this fact forces the capacity of the strongly limited adversary to be strictly below that of binary-symmetric channel 2 .
IV. STRONGLY-LIMITED ADVERSARY
The main result of the paper concerns the capacity of strongly limited adversary and is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 5:
(13) To show this, we need to show the existence of an apt adversarial strategy.
A. The adversary strategy
The adversary uses the following strategy. 4 . For the used code C, the adversary calculates L C (p, n) = ř wą2pn A w , where A w is the distance distribution of the code. The following two cases may occur.
1)
. That is, if for any absolute constant ,
ă for sufficiently large 3 n. In this case, the adversary first choses a codeword x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) P F Let, e = (e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n ). The received codeword is c + e.
2)
L C (p,n) |C| ě c for some absolute constant c for all n. In this case, the adversary just randomly and independently flips every bit with probability p.
B. Proof of Thm. 5
The following lemma will be useful in proving the theorem. Lemma 6 (Capacity of constrained input): Let R˚(p, ω), 0 ă ω ď 1 2 , denote the supremum of all achievable rates for a code (of length n) as n → ∞ such that:
1) Hamming weight of each codeword is at most ωn.
2) The average probability of error of using this code over BSC(p) goes to 0 as n → ∞.
Proof: This is a standard result. We calculate the mutual information between the input and output of the BSC(p), when the inputs are i.i.d. Bernoulli(ω) random variables to find the given expression. Such random code must contain almost as large a subset with weight of all codewords less than or equal to ωn. The converse follows from Fano's inequality.
Proof of Thm. 5: If p ď 1 4 then the adversary just simulates the binary symmetric channel. Below we consider the situation when p ą In what follows, we treat the two different scenarios for the adversary, based on the adversary strategy sketched above. Let C is the code that is used for transmission and {A w } is the distance distribution of the code, as usual.
Case 1: Let, x is the codeword adversary has initially chosen. Note that, if c is randomly and uniformly chosen from C, then, the random variable W = d H (c, x) is distributed according to {A w {|C|, w = 0, . . . n}.
We have,
Using Chernoff bound,
3 Indeed, whenever we talk about a code, we mean a code-family, that is indexed by n, the length. In this case, the adversary knows this code family.
Hence, for any ą 0, Pr wt(e) ă n(p + ) ą 1 − o(1), which implies that the adversary is strongly-p-limited. Now, just following the arguments of Thm. 1 we conclude that the code C will result in a probability of error at least 
For any codeword x P C, let A x w , w = 0, . . . , n be the local weight distribution, i.e., the number of codewords that are at distance w from x. Now as,
it is clear that there must exist a codeword x such that
This ensures that, there are at least c|C| codewords that belong within a Hamming ball of radius n − 2pn = n(1 − 2p). In particular, consider the ball of radius n − 2pn centered atx, wherex is the complement of c (all zeros are changed to ones, and vice versa). All the codewords of C that are distance more than 2pn away from x must belong to this ball; let us call the set of such codewords B Ă C. Clearly |B| ě c|C|.
Consider the average probability of error, when B is used to transmit a message over a BSC(p). Because, the Hamming space is translation invariant, the probability of error of such code is equal to the probability of error of a codeB that have the Hamming weight of each codeword bounded by n(1−2p). But from Lemma 6, the maximum possible rate for which the probability of error of using B in BSC(p) goes to 0 is R˚(p, 1 − 2p).
However, if we randomly pick up a codeword from C, with probability at least c ą 0, the codeword belong to B. Hence 1 n log |B| must be less than R˚(p, 1 − 2p), otherwise the average probability of error for C will be bounded away from 0. Hence, the rate of C is at most
2 ) − h B (p). The capacity of strongly-limited adversary is strictly bounded away from the capacity of BSC. Indeed, h B (1−3p+4p
2 ) ă 1 for all
. This is shown in Figure 1 .
C. Erasure Channel
The entire analysis of the above section can be extended for the case of a memoryless adversarial erasure channel, where instead of corrupting a symbol, the adversary introduces an erasure. Recently, an extension (that results in rather nontrivial observations) of the results of [8] , [10] for the case of erasures have been performed in [3] . The upper bound of Thm. 5 on the strongly-limited adversary. The capacity of omniscient, causal [8] , log-space [9] and weakly-limited adversaries are all 0 in this range.
We refrain from formally defining a binary-input memoryless adversarial erasure channel; however, that can be done easily along the lines of the introductory discussions of this paper. For the case of weakly-p-limited adversary the capacity is zero for all p ě 1 2 . On the other hand, we note that, for strongly-p-limited adversarial erasure channel the capacity is upper bounded by
for all p ě 
V. A CODE WITH SKEWED DISTANCE DISTRIBUTION
In conclusion we outline a possible route through which an improvement on the upper bound on C s (p) might be possible.
From the proof of Thm. 5 it is evident that a code C that has nonzero rate can achieve a zero probability of error for the strongly-p-limited adversary only if the distance distribution {A w , w = 0, . . . , n} satisfies, for some absolute constant c ą 0, ÿ wą2pn A w ě c|C|.
From, Delsarte's theory of linear-programming bounds [7] , it is possible to upper bound the maximum possible size of such code C. Indeed, this is given in the following theorem . Theorem 7: Suppose, a code C is such that its distance distribution {A w , w = 0, . . . , n} satisfies (15) for some c ą 0. Assume there exist a polynomial f(x) of degree at most n with,
and some β ą 0, that satisfy, 1) f 0 = 1, f k ě 0 for k = 1 . . . , n; 2) f(j) ď cβ for j = 1, . . . , 2pn and f(j) ď −(1 − c)β for j = 2pn + 1, . . . , n.
Then |C| ď f(0) − cβ.
Proof: We note that, A K i ě 0 for all i = 0, . . . , n, a set of linear constraints on the distance distribution whose sum we want to maximize. Moreover we have the extra linear constraint of (15) . We omit the rest of the proof, but if follows from standard arguments of LP bounds for codes. If one could find a polynomial that satisfies the above conditions then that gives bounds on the capacity of strongly-plimited adversary. Our current approach involves tweaking the existing polynomials that bound error-correcting codes (i.e., the MRRW polynomials [16] ) to construct a polynomial that satisfy the criteria of Thm. 7.
In conclusion, the first important open question regarding this model is whether the capacities of strongly and weaklylimited adversaries are strictly separated or not. We conjecture that C s (p) = 0 for a value of p strictly less than half.
